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Abstract. Attribute-based access control (ABAC) and role-based ac-
cess control (RBAC) are currently the two most popular access control
models. Yet, they both have known limitations and offer features com-
plimentary to each other. Due to this fact, integration of RBAC and
ABAC has recently emerged as an important area of research. In this
paper, we propose an access control model that combines the two mod-
els in a novel way in order to unify their benefits. Our approach provides
a fine-grained access control mechanism that not only takes contextual
information into account while making the access control decisions but
is also suitable for applications where access to resources is controlled by
exploiting contents of the resources in the policy.
Keywords: Context-aware access control, RBAC, Attributes, Content-
based access control, Role-permission explosion, Role-explosion
1 Introduction
RBAC [9] is the current standard access control model and has been a focus
of research since last two decades. The RBAC paradigm encapsulates privileges
into roles, and users are assigned to roles to acquire privileges, which makes it
simple and facilitates reviewing permissions assigned to a user. It also makes
the task of policy administration less cumbersome, as every change in a role is
immediately reflected on the permissions available to users assigned to that role.
A study [19] indicates that adoption of RBAC in commercial organizations is
continuously increasing.
Due to the advent of pervasive systems, authorization control has become
complex as access decisions may depend on the context in which access requests
are made. The contextual information represents a measurable contextual prim-
itive and may entail such information being associated with a user, object and
environment [6]. For example, an access control policy may depend on the user’s
current location, the object being currently in a specific state, and the time of
day when the access is requested. It has been recognized that RBAC is not
adequate for situations where contextual attributes are required parameters in
granting access to a user [16]. Another limitation of RBAC is that the permis-
sions are specified in terms of object identifiers, referring to individual objects.
This is not adequate in situations where a large number of objects in hundreds
of thousands exist and leads to role-permission explosion problem. Moreover,
in many applications, access to data is more naturally described in terms of its
semantic contents [2], for example, in a rating system of movies, violent movies
are restricted to audiences above a certain age, based on the movie contents.
A relatively new access control paradigm, ABAC [23] [13] has been identified
to overcome these limitations of RBAC [7]. ABAC is considered more flexible as
compared to RBAC, since it can easily accommodate contextual attributes as
access control parameters [16]. However, ABAC is typically much more complex
than RBAC in terms of policy review, hence analyzing the policy and reviewing
or changing user permissions are quite cumbersome tasks.
On one hand, both RBAC and ABAC have their particular advantages and
disadvantages. On the other hand, both have features complimentary to each
other, and thus integrating RBAC and ABAC has become an important research
topic [7], [14], [12]. Also, NIST has announced an initiative [16] to integrate
RBAC and its various extensions with ABAC in order to combine the advantages
offered by both RBAC and ABAC. In this context, we proposed earlier the
concept of an integrated RBAC and ABAC access control model [20]. In this
paper, we extend it further by presenting the formal model for our Attribute
Enhanced Role-Based Access Control model. We also present algorithms for two
different ways in which access requests may be evaluated. Moreover, we analyze
the properties of our model with the help of a scenario.
The model that we propose in this paper retains the flexibility offered by
ABAC, yet it maintains RBAC’s advantages of easier administration, policy
analysis and review of permissions. In addition, our solution has the following
key features: a) it allows to make context-aware access control decisions by asso-
ciating conditions with permissions that are used to verify whether the required
contextual information holds when a decision is made, b) it offers a content-based
authorization system while keeping the approach role-oriented, in order to retain
the advantages offered by RBAC. We achieve this by allowing to specify permis-
sions using attributes of the objects rather than using only their identifiers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: §2 summarizes related work and
compares our approach to prior work. In §3, we present the components of the
proposed access control model while §4 presents a formal model and different
possibilities in which a request may be evaluated. §5 discusses potential benefits
offered by the proposed approach. We conclude the paper and identify future
directions in §6.
2 Related Work
Kuhn et al [16] announced a NIST initiative to incorporate attributes into roles
in order to merge features of RBAC and ABAC. In response to this initiative, Jin
et al [14] present first formal access control model called RABAC. They extend
RBAC with user and object attributes and add a component called permission
filtering policy (PFP). The PFP requires specification of filtering functions in
the form of Boolean expression consisting of user and object attributes. Their
solution is useful to address the role-explosion problem and as a result facili-
tates user role assignment. However, the approach does not incorporate envi-
ronment attributes and is not suitable for systems involving frequently changing
attributes, e.g., location and time. Also, our approach is significantly different
in the sense that we make a fundamental modification in RBAC by using at-
tributes of the objects in the permissions, addressing the issue of role-permission
explosion, faced while using RABAC. Huang et al [12] present a framework to
integrate RBAC with attributes. The approach consists of two levels: under-
ground and aboveground. The underground level makes use of attribute-based
policies to automate the processes of user-role and role-permission assignment.
The aboveground level is the RBAC model, with addition of environment at-
tributes, constructed using attribute-based policies. Their work is different than
ours in that it focuses on automated construction of RBAC. Xu and Stoller [22]
focus on migration of RBAC-based systems to ABAC in order to avoid limita-
tions of RBAC. They present a solution to mine attribute-based policies from
an already configured RBAC model.
Several efforts have been reported which extend RBAC to include the context
of access. Some of the key works in this area include environment roles [4], spatio-
temporal RBAC [21] and context-aware RBAC [17]. However these approaches
typically require creation of a large number of closely related roles, causing the
role-explosion problem. Ge et al [11], and Giuri et al [10] focus on resolving the
issue of role explosion by providing the mechanism of parametrized privileges and
parametrized roles. However, the permissions in these solutions refer to objects
using their identifiers. Few approaches propose a variant of RBAC categorizing
the objects into groups or types in an attempt to resolve the role-permission
explosion issue [18], [5], [15]. Grouping the objects allows to associate a single
attribute with each object. The permissions are then specified using the group
attribute – referred to as views in [15] and object classes in [5] – where each
permission refers to a set of objects in that group. Moreover, as the number
of object attributes grow, the number of groups increase exponentially. This
makes task of policy administration cumbersome since for every new object to
be added in the system it has to be associated with all those groups to which
it belongs. Another area of research relevant to ours is content-based access
control, where access to a resource is dependent on the information contained
within the resource. Prior literature mainly uses attribute-based approaches to
handle this requirement [2], [1]. However, these approaches suffer from the ABAC
limitations, discussed earlier. Using a combination of roles and attributes may
help in simplifying the management and policy modification, as discussed in §5.
3 Overview of the Proposed Model
This section presents an overview of the proposed Attributes Enhanced Role-
Based Access Control model (AERBAC). Figure 1 depicts our access control
model and its components. The entities users, roles, objects and operations have
the same semantics as in RBAC. Users and objects in our model are associated
with attributes too. We also incorporate the environment attribute to fully cap-
ture the situation in which access needs to be authorized. The dotted-box in
Fig. 1 represents the modules of the architectural design to enforce this model.
Below, we first describe the attributes and then discuss semantics of different
components involved in AERBAC, including permissions, conditions, sessions
and request evaluation.
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Fig. 1: Attributes enhanced role-based access control (AERBAC) model
Attributes: Attributes capture the properties of specific entities (e.g. user).
We define an attribute function for each attribute that returns the value of that
attribute. Each attribute is represented by a range of finite sets of atomic values.
For example, the range of branch attribute is a set of names of branches semanti-
cally relevant for the application domain. User attributes capture the properties
of the user who initiates an access request. Examples of user attributes are ti-
tle, specialization, location, security clearance etc. Object attributes are used to
define the properties of the resources protected by the access control policy. Ex-
amples of object attributes include type, status, location, time of object creation
etc. Environment attributes capture external factors of the situation in which the
access takes place. Temperature, occurrence of an incident, system mode or other
information which not only pertains to a specific object or user, but may hold
for multiple entities, are typically modeled as environment attributes.
An attribute may be either static or dynamic. The values of static at-
tributes rarely change e.g. designation, department, type etc. On the other hand,
dynamic attribute values may change frequently and unpredictably, so they may
well change during the lifetime of a session. Examples of such attributes include
officer in command, location, occurrence of an incident etc. They are also referred
to as contextual attributes in the literature [6].
Permissions and conditions: In contrast to the traditional approaches
in RBAC, the permissions in AERBAC refer to objects indirectly, using their
attributes. A permission refers to a set of objects sharing common attributes, e.g.
type or branch, using a single permission, in contrast to separate permissions for
each unique object. This is particularly relevant in those domains where several
objects share common attribute values. This helps in significantly reducing the
number of permissions associated with a role, while increasing the expressiveness
and granularity of access control in a role-centric fashion.
In our proposed model, a permission consists of an object expression and an
authorized operation on the object set denoted by the expression. Object expres-
sions are formed using the attributes of objects. Each permission is associated
with one or more conditions, which must be evaluated to be true in order for
the user to exercise that permission. A condition associated with a permission
may contain attributes of all entities including users, objects and environment.
In some applications, it is required to compare user and object attributes – for
example, in a bank, a manager of a branch is allowed to access only those ac-
counts belonging to his own branch. The proposed model allows to perform such
comparisons using conditions.
An example of a permission is: p= ( (oType(o) = secret ∧ oStatus(o) = ac-
tive), read) which states that a role having this permission can perform read
operation on the objects denoted by the given object expression. Here oType
and oStatus are object attribute functions that return the values of respective
attributes for a given object. Suppose that the permission p is constrained by
a condition c= (uMember(u) = premium ∧ time of day() ≤ uDutyExpire(u))
where uMember and uDutyExpire are user attribute functions that return the at-
tribute values of a given user, whereas time of day() is an environment attribute
function. This condition implies that, in order to be granted the permission p,
the user must be a premium user and time of access must be before the end of
user’s duty timing.
The Context Manager is responsible for propagating the updated values of
dynamic attributes of the users, objects and environment. Depending on the
application, some of these attribute values may also be provided by the user while
placing an access request, however the application must ensure the authenticity
of such information before using it in access decisions.
Session: A session contains a list of permissions associated with the roles
activated by the user. As described earlier, the permissions are different from
standard RBAC permissions in terms of referring to the objects using their
attributes and being tied with the conditions that are evaluated every time a
permission is to be exercised. Hence, the CheckAccess function needs to be re-
defined.
Access request: An important consideration, in environments motivating
the proposed approach, is that the user’s request may also be based on the
attributes of the objects. For instance, in a medical imaging application, a user
might want to view all images containing specified characteristics e.g., objects
with type = tumor and domain = hospital-nw. For a user request to be granted,
there must exist an object expression in the user’s session that denotes the
requested objects, and the condition tied to that object expression must be
evaluated to be true. There are different possibilities in which such a request
may be evaluated and we discuss them later in the paper (cf. §4.1).
Table 1: Sets and Functions used in AERBAC
– USERS, ROLES, OBS, and OPS (users, roles, objects and operations respectively)
– URA ⊆ USERS × ROLES, a many-to-many mapping of user-to-role assignment;
– SESSIONS, the set of sessions;
– user sessions(u: USERS)→ 2SESSIONS, the mapping of user u onto a set of sessions;
– session roles(s: SESSIONS)→ 2ROLES, the mapping of session s onto a set of roles.
Formally: session roles(si) ⊆ { r ∈ ROLES | (session user(si), r) ∈ URA};
– avail session perms(s: SESSIONS) → 2PRMS, the permissions available to a user
in a session.
– UATT, OATT and EATT represent finite sets of user, object and environment
attribute functions respectively.
– For each att in UATT ∪ OATT ∪ EATT, Range(att) represents the attribute’s
range, a finite set of atomic values.
– attType: UATT ∪ OATT ∪ EATT→ {setType, atomicType}, specifies attributes
as set or atomic valued.
– OBJ EXP = Set of all object expressions formed using the language given in Table
2.
– COND = Set of all conditions formed using the language given in Table 2.
– PRMS = 2 (OPS × OBJ EXP), the set of permissions.
– RPA ⊆ ROLES × PRMS × COND
– Each attribute function in UATT, OATT and EATT returns either atomic or set
values.
∀ua ∈ UATT. ua : USERS→
{
Range(ua) if attType(ua) = atomicType
2Range(ua) if attType(ua) = setType
∀oa ∈ OATT. oa : OBS→
{
Range(oa) if attType(oa) = atomicType
2Range(oa) if attType(oa) = setType
∀ea ∈ EATT. ea→
{
Range(ea) if attType(ea) = atomicType
2Range(ea) if attType(ea) = setType
4 Formal AERBAC Model
In this section, we propose the formal model that incorporates the attributes of
the user, object and environment into RBAC in a role-oriented fashion. We define
the sets and functions used in AERBAC in Table 1. The upper part of the table
shows the sets and functions defined in NIST RBAC which are also applicable
to AERBAC. We provide further sets and functions needed for AERBAC in the
lower part of the table. UATT, OATT and EATT represent sets of attribute
functions for users, objects and environment, respectively. The notion we used
for attribute representation is adapted from [13]. We use first order logic to
make formal descriptions, and follow the convention that all unbound variables
are universally quantified given as Range(att). Each attribute function returns
either a set or an atomic value, determined based on the type of the attribute
(i.e. attType). Attribute functions in UATT and OATT take as an argument a
user and an object, respectively. Each attribute functions in EATT may or may
not require an argument, depending on the attribute and the target system. For
instance, in a banking system with multiple branches, an environment attribute
function would require the branch name to return the value of an environment
attribute, e.g., current-system-load, in that branch.
The role-permission assignment (RPA) relation captures permissions that
are assigned to a role when a given set of conditions are fulfilled. Clearly, the
permission set may change for a role if the conditions vary between requests.
Permissions in AERBAC are specified using object expressions. The language to
define an object expression and a condition is given in the first part of Table 2.
The second part of the table specifies how instances of set and atomic may be
formed to define an object expression and a condition. ConsSet and ConsAtomic
are constant sets and atomic values. The object expressions may be specified
using only attributes of the objects. While for specifying a condition, attributes
of user, object and environment may be used. The function sesseion user(se)
is defined in NIST RBAC[9] that returns the user to whom a given session se
belongs to.
4.1 Access Decisions
The main role of the access control mechanism is to verify whether a user u,
requesting access to object o, using an operation op, is authorized to do so.
As mentioned above, a user request can either explicitly specify an object, by
listing its identifier, or can implicitly denote a set of objects using the attributes
of the objects. If the user request is not for a specific object but rather a set
of objects, the system must consider the given criteria to return the requested
objects. Once a user submits an access request, the request is to be evaluated
against the policy. The function checkAccess in RBAC needs to be modified
such that it takes the user request as input, processes the request as per the
format of a given request, and returns the result. In the following, we elaborate
on evaluation of both identifier-based and attribute-based requests.
a) Identifier-based request: In identifier-based request, the user specifies
the identifier of the object to be accessed. The evaluation of such type of request
is straight-forward. In this case, the input of the function checkAccess consists of
a session se, an operation m, and an object obj. Recall that a permission consists
of an object expression and an operation and is constrained by a condition. The
checkAccess function returns true if and only if i) there exists a permission p, in
the avail session perms of session se, that contains an object expression which
evaluates to true for obj, ii) m matches op, and iii) the corresponding condition
c evaluates to true.
b) Attribute-based request: Using the second form of request, user may
specify the attributes of the object in his/her request, rather than a unique
identifier of the object. Specifying the object attributes in the request implies
Table 2: Language to form object expressions and conditions
ϕ ::= ϕ∧ϕ|ϕ∨ϕ|(ϕ)| set setcompare set | atomic ∈ set | atomic atomiccompare atomic
setcompare ::= ⊂ | ⊆ | *
atomiccompare ::= <| = | ≤ | 6=
To define an object expression, set and atomic are as follows:
– set::= setoa(o:OBS) | ConsSet
– atomic::= atomicoa(o:OBS) | ConsAtomic
– setoa ∈ {oa | oa ∈ OATT ∧ attType(oa) = setType}
– atomicoa ∈ {oa | oa ∈ OATT ∧ attType(oa) = atomicType}
For condition specification, set and atomic are as follows:
– set::= setua (session user(se)) | setoa(o:OBS) | setea() | ConsSet
– atomic::= atomicua (session user(se)) | atomicoa(o:OBS) | atomicea() | Con-
sAtomic
– setua ∈ {ua | ua ∈ UATT ∧ attType(ua) = setType }
– atomicua ∈ {ua | ua ∈ UATT ∧ attType(ua)= atomicType }
– setoa ∈ {oa | oa ∈ OATT ∧ attType(oa) = setType}
– atomicoa ∈ {oa | oa ∈ OATT ∧ attType(oa) = atomicType}
– setea ∈ {ea | ea ∈ EATT ∧ attType(ea) = setType}
– atomicea ∈ {ea | ea ∈ EATT ∧ attType(ea) = atomicType}
that the user wishes to access all those objects which have the specified attribute
values. Below we discuss two possibilities to formulate and process such requests.
b.1) Resource query: In this approach, user request contains an expression
similar to the object expressions. An example user request could be: Req = <se,
(otype = secret ∧ odept = admin ∧ ostatus = inactive), write> which states that
the owner of the session se wishes to exercise the write operation on the objects
denoted by the given object expression. The checkAccess function receives as
input the access request Req and returns the authorized objects to the user,
if request is granted, otherwise the request is denied. The given expression is
converted to a query and the resulting objects are retrieved from the resource
database. Next step is to find the applicable object expressions by matching the
user’s requested operation with the ones mentioned in the permission set existing
in user’s session. Once the object expressions are shortlisted, they are evaluated
one-by-one for each object returned by the query. If an object expression and its
corresponding condition evaluate to true for an object, the object is added into
the list of authorized objects to be granted to the user. Finally, user is granted
access to all those objects for which an object expression and its corresponding
condition return true. Figure 2 presents algorithm for this approach. Since the
object expressions are to be evaluated for each returned object, this approach
may prove to be expensive in cases where several objects are returned by the
query formed based on user’s request.
Algorithm 1
Input: An access request: Req = <se, re, m >consisting of session identifier se, request
expression re, and operation m.
Output: 1) Accept and return authorized objects, 2) Reject otherwise
Begin:
1: relevant expressions = Φ;
2: object set = Φ;
3: authorized objects = Φ;
4: object set = search objects*(re);
5: if object set 6= Φ then
6: for all perm<object exp, op>∈ avail session perms do
7: if m = op then
8: relevant expressions ← relevant expressions ∪ object exp;
9: end if
10: end for
11: for all object ∈ object set do
12: for all object exp ∈ relevant expressions do
13: if evaluate†(object exp, object) then
14: if eval cond‡(condition, object, session user(se)) then
15: authorized objects ← authorized objects ∪ object;
16: break;
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: end if
22: if authorized object 6= Φ then
23: return authorized objects;
24: end if
25: return Reject;
End
* search objects(re) returns a set of objects existing in the resource database that are
denoted by the constraints specified in expression re, in the request.
† evaluate(object exp, object) returns TRUE if object exp evaluates to true for the
given object, else returns FALSE.
‡ eval cond(condition, object, session user(se)) returns TRUE if given condition eval-
uates to true for the given object attributes and the attributes of the user and the
environment.
Fig. 2: Algorithm for access request evaluation using resource query
b.2) Attribute values: An alternative strategy is to evaluate the user’s
request against the object expressions before retrieving the actual objects from
the resource database. In this approach, rather than providing an expression,
user specifies his/her access request by specifying the object attribute values of
the desired objects. The checkAccess function receives as input the user request
Req and returns the objects denoted by object attribute values given in Req, if
request is granted, otherwise the request is denied. To process user request, all
Algorithm 2
Input: An access request: Req = < se, obj att values, m> consisting of session iden-
tifier se, object attribute values obj att values, and operation m.
Output: 1) Accept and return authorized objects, 2) Reject otherwise
Begin:
1: relevant expressions = Φ;
2: authorized objects = Φ;
3: for all perm < object exp, op > ∈ avail session perms do
4: if m = op ∧ check relevancy*(obj exp, obj att values) then
5: if evaluate† (object exp, obj att values) then
6: if eval cond‡(condition, obj att values, session user(se) then
7: authorized objects = get objects††(obj att values);
8: end if
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: if authorized object 6= Φ then
13: return (Accept, authorized objects)
14: end if
15: return (Reject)
End
* check relevancy(object exp, obj att values) returns TRUE if the given object exp
uses only those object attribute functions referred in obj att values
† evaluate(object exp, obj att values) returns TRUE if the given object exp evaluates
to true when the object attribute functions are replaced with obj att values
‡ eval cond(condition, obj att values, session user(se)) returns TRUE if the given
condition evaluates to true for the given object attributes and the attributes of the
user and environment
†† get objects(obj att values) returns a set of objects existing in the resource database
that satisfy obj att values
Fig. 3: Algorithm for access request evaluation using attribute values
those object expressions existing in user’s session are identified which use the
attributes mentioned in the user’s request and the operation specified in that
permission matches with requested operation. Object expressions that include
an attribute not specified by the user request are not relevant. Next, for each
shortlisted object expression, the attribute functions in the object expression
are given the user provided attribute values. For instance, if a user specifies the
following object attribute in his/her request: (otype = classified; odept = pg;
ostatus = active) and suppose we find an object expression as follows: (otype(o)
= classified ∧ odept(o) ⊆ {pg, ug, admin}). Upon picking the values of the
object attribute functions otype and odept from user given attribute values we
get: (classified = classified ∧ pg ⊆ {pg, ug, admin}) which would evaluate to
true. As soon as an object expression and its corresponding condition return
true, the user’s request is granted and rest of the object expressions are ignored.
When an expression returns true we form a query based on the object attribute
values specified in the user request and the user is granted access to all those
objects returned by the query. Algorithm for this approach is given in Fig. 3.
Note that we never evaluate an object expression which uses an object at-
tribute not given in the user’s request. This is because we replace the object
attribute functions with the user given attribute values, hence any object expres-
sion involving those object attributes not given by the user cannot be evaluated.
The query to get the authorized objects is formed using the object attributes
mentioned in the user’s request. Once an object expression returns true, this
query may restrict the list of returned objects based on any additional attributes
mentioned in the user’s request. In the example above, the returned result is re-
stricted based on additional object attributes ostatus which are mentioned in the
user’s request but does not exist in the expression which enables the request.
This approach is superior to resource query in terms of making an access
decision by evaluating only the object expressions, without having to retrieve
objects from the resource database. This is important, since many requests can
be denied at this point without the overhead of object retrieval and condition
evaluation. An obvious assumption made in this form of user request is that the
multiple object attributes mentioned in the user request are always combined
using logical conjunction operator.
5 Discussion
To illustrate the features of the proposed access control model, we present an
example below, inspired from the online entertainment store example presented
in [23]. Suppose an online entertainment store streams movies to subscribed
users. Suppose, there are two different types of users; Adult and Juvenile. Adult
users can view all movies while Juvenile can view only G-rated movies. Using the
standard RBAC approach, clearly we need two roles to represent Juvenile and
Adult users. In each role the permissions have to be specified using identifiers
of the objects individual movies. Considering that there may exist thousands
of movies in the database, referring each with its identifier would lead to role-
permission explosion problem. To address this issue, AERBAC integrates roles
and attributes in a novel way and uses the attributes of the objects in the
permissions rather than identifiers of individual objects. Table 3 provides an
example where permissions make use of object attributes. In this example, the
role Adult is inherited by Juvenile role and hence inherits permissions assigned
to Juvenile role.
Table 3: Permissions in AERBAC
Role Permissions
Adult (view, (rating(m) = R))
Juvenile (view, (rating(m) = G))
In order to model multiple characteristics associated with user, object or
environment, the number of roles in RBAC increase exponentially. Suppose we
want to ensure that only premium users may view newly released movies and
regular users may view newly released movies only during promotional periods.
To represent these conditions in standard RBAC, we would need to create at
least six roles: Adult premium, Adult promo, Adult regular, Juvenile premium,
Juvenile promo and Juvenile regular, where Adult promo and Juvenile promo
roles would be available to users only during promotional periods. Configuring
this using AERBAC, we need only two roles: Adult and Juvenile as we use
attributes of objects in the permissions and other attributes in the condition
corresponding to each permission. Table 4 provides the configuration of this
scenario using the proposed approach.
Table 4: Example configuration using AERBAC
Role Permissions Conditions
Adult
(view, (rating(m) = R ∧ release(m) =
new) )
(userType(u) = premium ∨
today ∈ PromoDates)
(view, (rating(m) = R ∧ release(m) =
old) )
None
Juvenile
(view, (rating(m) = G ∧ release(m) =
new) )
(userType(u) = premium ∨
today ∈ PromoDates)
(view, (rating(m) = G ∧ release(m) =
old) )
None
Our motivation to integrate RBAC with attributes is to obtain advantages
associated with both RBAC and ABAC, while addressing the limitations of
RBAC and ABAC. Using a pure ABAC approach, in configuring situation such
as above requires writing policy rules. When a user request needs to be evaluated,
the relevant rules are identified using the attributes associated with requesting
user, requested object and current environment. These shortlisted rules are then
evaluated one-by-one unless we find a rule which allows the request. In contrast,
our approach requires evaluation of only those object expressions which are
associated with the roles activated by a user in his/her session. Note that this
may significantly reduce the number of rules to be evaluated. Moreover, the user
or environment attributes used in the conditions are evaluated only if an object
expression evaluates to true for a given request. This is particularly useful in
cases where user or environment attributes are dynamic and their current values
are reported at the time of request evaluation. In our approach, such values
would only need to be obtained if an object expression in the user’s session
returns true. This indicates that many user requests may be denied, just by
evaluating object expressions, without obtaining the current values for user and
environment attributes.
5.1 Merits of the Proposed Model
As discussed above, the object expressions and conditions that are to be eval-
uated against a user request are determined by the roles a user activates in a
session. Imagine a user assigned to a senior executive role in an organization
which has several privileges. For a user in this role, we might allow to access
specific resources without giving any consideration to the time of request and
location of user, for instance. This implies that there may be some attributes
which are not relevant for a given role and hence the number of conditions and
object expressions to be evaluated for that role may be reduced.
Compared to ABAC, our approach provides a systematic mechanism to eval-
uate a subset of policy rules which are determined based on the user’s roles,
yet retaining the advantages offered by RBAC including quick assignment and
revocation of roles to users, reviewing of permissions assigned to a user or role,
and reduced complexity of administration in large organizations. Moreover, we
believe several limitations of the RBAC and ABAC approaches may be overcome
using the approach we proposed. Below, we enlist some of these limitations and
discuss how our approach overcomes these problems.
1- Fine-grained Access Control: RBAC provides a coarse-grained access
control model where as many applications require a much finer-degree of granu-
larity [8]. In order to satisfy the requirements posed by such applications, a large
number of roles have to be created when pure RBAC is used. Using the proposed
approach, we may provide a finer-grained access control mechanism without cre-
ating a large number of roles. As discussed in the example, we achieve this by
associating conditions at permission level to check further attributes associated
with a user and environment rather than granting a permission merely based on
being a member of a role.
2- Context-aware Access: RBAC cannot easily handle dynamically chang-
ing attributes [7]. It typically does not support making contextual decisions un-
less many similar roles are created causing role-explosion problem. We provide a
mechanism to incorporate these dynamically changing attributes in a role-centric
manner yet without requiring to create a large number of roles. An important
feature of our approach is checking the values of such attributes at the time of
granting access rather than checking them at the time of session creation as done
typically in RBAC.
3- Easy Auditing: When ABAC is used in a considerably large organization
having a large number of policy rules, it may not be practically feasible to audit
what permissions have been granted to a user. In ABAC, any combination of
attributes may essentially grant an access and hence it requires to analyze all
policy rules with an exhaustive enumeration of attributes used in each policy rule
[7]. Our approach makes it simpler to audit what permissions may be granted to
a user because of being role-centric while adding the flexibility and fine-grained
access features offered by ABAC. When auditing for a particular position or
employee, we need to consider only the policy rules given in the roles assigned
to that position or employee.
4- Policy Modification Visualization: One of the issues in the ABAC
approach is that the consequences of a newly added or removed policy rule are
not easy to visualize [3]. It is not clear what set of users will be effected by a
change in the policy. A change in policy essentially may affect those users who
we wish to remain authorized to access a particular resource but they are no
more authorized since a policy rule is removed. In our approach, it is relatively
easy to visualize what is the impact of adding or removing a policy since policy
specification is at the level of role. Therefore, a change in policy can effect only
those users who are assigned to a role being modified.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an access control model that integrates RBAC and
ABAC bringing together the features offered by both models. In our model,
the attributes may be associated with users, objects and environment allowing
the request context to be considered in making access control decisions. Unlike
traditional RBAC approaches, permissions in our model consist of operations
and object expressions enabling content-based access control. We presented dif-
ferent request evaluation mechanisms that may be used by various applications
depending on their requirements. We demonstrated the merits of the proposed
model in the discussion section using a scenario. In the future, we plan to work
on formally analyzing the properties offered by the proposed model as compared
to existing access control model including ABAC and RBAC, and to develop
an XACML profile of the proposed model. Further directions for future work
include use of cache mechanisms to further expedite the access control decision
process, to extend the model with continuous enforcement to deactivate a role or
revoke a permission when context conditions fail to hold, and to include negative
authorizations in the model.
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